We use the framework of Aghion et:al: (1997, 2001) to study the interaction between product market competition, innovation and R&D subsidies intended to decrease the cost of innovation. We show theoretically that a proportional R&D subsidy accelerates innovation activity at all degrees of competition, but less so at high degrees of competition. In other words, the R&D subsidy reinforces the Schumpeterian e¤ect on innovation. Our empirical results give support to this …nding: increasing R&D subsidy steepen the negative slope of the inverted U-shape curve at high degrees of competition.
INTRODUCTION
Modern growth theory emphasises the central role of product market competition in …rms' innovative activities. More intense product market competition (PMC) stimulates innovation activities when it increases the di¤erence between post-innovation and preinnovation rents. In other words, competition may increase the incremental pro…ts from innovating and thereby encourage R&D investment. The original Schumpeter's (1934) prediction was that competition decreases innovation, simply because it drives down the …rms' pro…ts. Aghion et al. (1997) and Aghion et al. (2001) developed a theory where these two e¤ects are combined. They derive a result where the relationship between competition and innovation has an inverted-U shape. In their model, the inverted-U shape results from the interplay between the escape-from-competition-e¤ect and the Schumpeterian e¤ect.
In this paper we introduce state aid to R&D activity into the model of Aghion et al. (2001) . 1 We look exclusively at R&D subsidies although it is an open question whether R&D subsidies or tax credit to R&D are more e¤ective in increasing R&D intensity. 2 We let R&D subsidies to decrease proportionally the costs of innovating and thus alter the di¤erence between post-and pre-innovation rents. It turns out that R&D subsidies accelerate innovation at di¤erent degrees of competition, but this e¤ect becomes smaller when competition is …erce. This is primarily due to strategic substitutability e¤ect. It states that any factorsuch as R&D subsidy -which increases the innovation of the neck-and-neck …rm decreases the innovation of the follower …rm. We show that as competition becomes more intense, this strategic substitutability e¤ect becomes stronger. This is con…rmed by the numerical simulation of the model. Simulations show that at high level of competition, inverted-U shape becomes steeper when R&D subsidies are higher. Otherwise, R&D subsidies leave the shape of the relationship between competition and innovation intact.
In order to test these hypotheses, we extend the empirical approach of Aghion et al. (2005) by allowing for interaction between R&D subsidies and competition. We use …rm and plant level data on patenting activity, product market competition and R&D subsidies granted for the Finnish …rms over the period [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] . We claim that the Finnish case suits very well to our empirical exercise. Namely, the European integration process and severe recession in 1990-1992 speed up product markets'liberalization and privatization of publicly owned companies. In particular, opening up of the product markets to foreign competition was felt heavily in the Finnish …rms, forcing them to increase their productivity and competitiveness. Moreover, around the same time, competition policy became a recognized policy tool along with the founding of the national competition authority in 1988. R&D subsidies also played an important role in restructuring of the Finnish industry from a production of low-tech to high-tech products. This was re ‡ected through the creation of Finnish Funding Agency for Technology and Innovation (Tekes) in 1983 and rapid increase of R&D funding since early 1990s.
Since its founding, Tekes has directed a major part of public R&D subsidies to the …rms. These subsidies form a cornerstone of Tekes'funding, being roughly 40 % of its total budget. Our measure of the public R&D support used in the empirical analysis correspond to these Tekes'R&D subsidies. Finally, we complete the data with the case-by-case investigations of potential distortions of competition by the Finnish competition authority, and a set of privatization decisions. They are used as quasi-natural experiment to remove the endogeneity problem associated to our competition measure, as in Aghion et al. (2005) .
Our empirical …ndings can be summarized as follows. First, we …nd empirical evidence in favor of the inverted-U shape between innovation and competition. This result supports the …ndings of Aghion et al. (2005) who also …nd the inverted-U shape using the data on stock listed …rms in the UK. Second, in line with our theoretical prediction, we …nd evidence that direct R&D subsidies increase innovation. However, the positive e¤ect of R&D subsidies to innovation is smaller when competition becomes more intense. This is due to the negative cross-e¤ect of innovation and competition found in the data.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents analytically the model of Aghion et al. (2001) and develops the extensions to the model. Section 3 provides a description of the data and discusses which variables are best suited for measuring their theoretical counterparts developed in the previous section. Section 4 outlines the empirical methods used. Section 5 provides the empirical results and …nally section 6 concludes.
I THEORETICAL ISSUES OF COMPETITION AND INNOVATION
In this paper, we focus on a speci…c model of Aghion et al. (2001) , henceforth, for convenience, AHHV. Their model gives a theoretical rationale for an inverted-U relationship between degree of product market competition and rate of innovation. The innovation process is assumed to be of a 'step-by-step' character, where the follower in any industry must …rst catch up with the technological leader before being able to become a leader itself. In contrast to Schumpeterian growth models, the incumbent …rm may also innovate in this model.
From this it follows, that innovation incentives depend more on the di¤ erence between post-innovation rents and pre-innovation rents than upon post-innovation rents per se. In particular, more intense product market competition (PMC) may stimulate …rms'innovative activities because it may reduce the …rms'pre-innovation rents by more than it reduces their post-innovation rents. In other words, competition may increase the incremental pro…ts from innovating and thereby encourage R&D investment. This is in sharp contrast to the Schumpeterian prediction. 3
The basic model AHHV formalize a step-by-step technological progress making use of a model of dynamic competition between two …rms originally formalized by Budd et al. (1993) . Their solution concept is subgame-perfect equilibrium in Markov strategies. Each …rm's R&D e¤ort depends only on its current technological state (ie on whether the …rm is a leader, a follower or has equal technology as the competitor), and not on the …rm, on the industry to which the …rm belongs or the time.
A basic model is depicted with a logarithmic production technology where the …nal output is produced using the input from a continuum of intermediate sectors
where each industry i is duopolistic with respect to both production and research activities, with …rms A and B: The production technology is of Constant Elasticity of Substitution form
( 2) Competition is measured using the elasticity of substitution parameter 2 [0; 1] and the demand functions for the intermediate goods can be derived by optimizing (2) subject to the budget constraint where the wage rate is normalized to unity p Ai q Ai +p Bi q Bi = 1. From this maximization problem it follows that the demand functions facing the two …rms in industry i are given by
Bi :
(4) Accordingly, the elasticity of demand that each intermediate inputs producing …rm j in some industry i faces is j = (1 j) (1 ) , where j = p j q j is the revenue of the …rm. Thus, the symmetric revenue equation for two …rms is
Consequently, under Bertrand competition the equilibrium price of the inputs of each …rm are given by
and its equilibrium pro…t is
Equations (5), (6) and (7) can be solved for unique equilibrium revenues, prices and pro…ts. Given the degree of substitutability the equilibrium pro…t of each …rm j is determined by its relative production cost. The relative production cost z is calculated by dividing the unit production cost of …rm j by the unit production cost of the other …rm j, ie z = cj c j : This implies that, the industry demand being unit elastic, an equiproportional reduction in both c A and c B would induce the …rms to adjust the price in the same proportion without a¤ecting the degree of competition and hence not …rm's revenues and pro…ts. Consequently, only a change in relative pro…t levels is of interest from the …rm's point of view. The pro…t functions
are therefore implicitly de…ned by (5)-(7). The substitutability parameter in the pro…t function (7) corresponds to the standard measures of competition and can be used to parameterize the degree of competition within each industry. This can also be motived by the arguments of Boone (2000) . Namely, he points out that any parameter positively a¤ecting the pro…tability of having lower unit production costs or products of better quality than other …rms is a suitable measure of product market competition.
In the model labour is the only input employed by …rms producing according to a constant-returns production function. Further, wage rate is taken as given leading to the unit costs of production c A and c B of the two …rms in the industry being independent of the quantities produced. The technology level of a duopoly …rm in a given industry is denoted as k. In order to produce one unit of intermediate good, this …rm needs to employ k units of labor, where > 1 is a parameter that measures the size of a leading-edge innovation. The state of an industry is thus fully characterized by a pair of integers (l; m), where l is the leader's technology and m is the technology gap of the leader over the follower (m = 0 when the …rms are neck-and-neck). The equilibrium pro…t ‡ow m (resp. m ) of a …rm m steps ahead (resp. behind) of its rival depends on the size of the gap m. 4 AHHV derive the following Bellman equations that depict the annuity value V j , j = m; 0; m; of being a technological leader (in an industry with a technology gap m, a neckand-neck …rm (both …rms have equal technologies), or a follower:
Here w denotes the wage rate, w (x) 2 2 the R&D cost function of a …rm performing R&D, and moving one technological step ahead with a Poisson hazard rate x, h is a help factor that characterize the ease of imitation of the follower, and r denotes the individual rate of time preference. In words, the annuity value of currently being a leader in an industry with gap m at date t equals the current ‡ow m minus the current R&D cost w (x) 2 2 plus the discounted expected capital gain x m (V m+1 V m ) from making an innovation and thereby moving one further step ahead of the follower, minus the expected capital loss (x m + h) (V m 1 V m ) from having the follower catch up by one step with the leader. The equations for the annuity value of the follower and neck-and-neck …rm are similarly explained. Notice though, that in the Bellman equation for the neck-and-neck …rm there is no help factor h because the lack of a leader. Also in symmetric Nash equilibrium both neck-and-neck …rms'R&D intensities are equal. Now, using the fact that each …rm uses its own R&D intensity to maximize its current value, ie to maximize the RHS of the corresponding Bellman equation, the following …rst order conditions are obtained
One-step case with R&D subsidy AHHV also discuss a case where the size of the innovation is very large and the leaders do not conduct R&D. In this case, the length of a lead cannot be greater than one innovation. AHHV show that when ! 1, the equilibrium level of R&D e¤ort of the leading …rm will approach zero. When is very large, even a one-step lead would raise the leader's pro…t almost to the maximal level 1 ; ' 1 for 0 ; and thus the incentive to innovate would decrease. This greatly simpli…es the AHHV model and allows the results to be derived analytically. The one-step case of AHHV developed in the remainder of this section is reformulated only to the extent that we introduce a wage subsidy for R&D activity. This is done in order to analyse how a wage subsidy to R&D interacts with competition.
In the one-step case, the maximum technological gap between leader and follower in an industry is m = 1: In this case, the …rm's R&D e¤ort is x m , where m 2 ( 1; 0; 1) and the expected present value of the pro…t is denoted V 1 ,V 0 and V 1 respectively for a follower …rm, neck-and-neck …rm, and leader in an industry. The labour supply is perfectly elastic allowing for taking the wage rate as given and normalizing it to unity ( = w = 1). There is no help factor for the followers (h = 0). Let 2 (0; 1) denote a direct R&D subsidy which reduces the costs of innovating proportionally to the R&D costs x 2 m =2. The Bellman equations for equilibrium R&D investments can then be written as
In the above equations, (1 ) can be interpreted as the …rm's own share of its R&D costs, while is a direct proportional subsidy. Using the fact that the technological leader's incentives to invest in R&D are driven down to zero (x 1 = 0), the …rst order conditions for the neck-and-neck …rm and the follower are derived as
Consequently, the innovation probabilities of the neck-and-neck …rm and the follower are
When examining the e¤ects of competition on the innovation probability in the one-step case, Aghion et al. (2005) assume that a reduction in the neck-and-neck pro…ts 0 represents intensi…ed product market competition. 5 Aghion et al. (2005) argue that the analysis and the results in the one-step case can be replicated parameterizing competition by the elasticity parameter, . Equations (16) and (17) imply that intensi…ed product market competition, as characterized by a fall in the neck-and-neck pro…ts 0 will lead to an increase in the R&D e¤ort of the neck-and-neck …rm, x 0 : The follower will decrease its R&D e¤ort x 1 as the PMC is intensi…ed. This opposing behavior of the neck-and-neck …rm and the follower, in regard to R&D e¤orts, resulting from intensi…ed PMC, is explained by two di¤erent e¤ects. As for the decrease in R&D e¤ort of a follower x 1 . Aghion et al. (2005) argue that this is the basic Schumpeterian e¤ ect at work, resulting from the reduced prospective rent of the successful innovator ( 0 1 ), which manages to catch up with its rival. More intense competition induces a neck-and-neck …rm to innovate, in order to escape competition. Thus, these …rms increase their innovative activity, so that x 0 increases. This is because, as the di¤erence in pro…ts between being a leader and being a neck-and-neck …rm ( 1 0 ) increases ( 0 falls and 1 remains unchanged), the incremental value of getting ahead increases with intensi…ed PMC. Aghion et al. (2005) refer to this e¤ect as the escape competition effect. The sum of these e¤ects is that the higher the fraction of neck-and-neck sectors in the economy, the more positive the e¤ect of intensi…ed PMC on the average innovation rate.
Competition and innovation
The aggregate e¤ect of intensi…ed product market competition on the steady-state innovation rate is ambiguous, because of its di¤erent e¤ects on industries in leveled (neck-and-neck) and unleveled (leader-follower) states. The overall e¤ect on average productivity growth depends on the time a sector spends being neck-and-neck in the steady-state. This is formulated by letting 1 and 0 respectively denote the steady-state probability of being unleveled and leveled. During any unit time interval an unleveled sector can become leveled with a steadystate probability, 1 x 1 . Furthermore, the probability of a leveled sector becoming unleveled is 2 0 x 0 , which is the aggregate probability of one of the …rms innovating when both …rms try to escape competition. In the steady-state these two probabilities must be equal since the fraction of sectors in each state must remain unchanged. Combining (18) with the fact that the fractions of unleveled and leveled sectors sum up to one ( 1 + 0 = 1) yields the steady-state distribution of the fractions 1 and 0 0 =
and further the average rate of innovation Aghion et al. (2005) show by numerical simulations of the model, that the relation between product market competition and the innovation rate, I, follows an inverted-U shaped pattern.
Inverted-U relationship
An inverted-U relationship is obtained between PMC and the average innovation rate. 6 From the analysis of how intensi…ed competition a¤ects the average innovation rate, it follows that, when competition is initially low, intensi…ed competition may raise the rate of innovation through the escape from the competition e¤ect on neck-and-neck …rms. When competition is already …erce, the Schumpeterian e¤ect may decrease the innovation rate, by decreasing the followers' incentive to innovate. The inverted-U shaped pattern between competition and innovation results from the interplay between the escape competition and the Schumpeterian e¤ects. The reason why one e¤ect is stronger for low degrees of competition, whereas the other dominates for high degrees, is due to the composition e¤ ect on the steady state distribution of leveled and unleveled industries. The composition e¤ect can be seen more clearly from the steady state distribution of the fraction of industries in the leveled state and the unleveled state in equation (19). When there is no competition ( 0 = 1 ), it is clear from equation (16) that x 0 = 0, and thus the industry is always leveled ( 0 = 1 in (19)). Under perfect competition ( 0 = 1 ), (16) and (17) imply that neck-and-neck R&D e¤orts will be larger than followers'R&D e¤orts, x 0 > x 1 . Thus, the overall rate of innovation is at least twice as high in the leveled state as in the unleveled state. Hence the fraction of time 1 spent in the leveled state is less than 1=3 under perfect competition.
At low levels of PMC, most sectors will be leveled, and the escape competition e¤ect dominates on average, whereas at high levels of PMC, most sectors will be unleveled, and the Schumpeterian e¤ect on followers'R&D e¤orts dominates on average. This in turn implies that intensi…ed PMC will have a positive e¤ect on innovative activity at low initial levels of PMC and a negative e¤ect at high initial levels of PMC.
Innovation and R&D subsidies

Individual industries
In order to see how a proportional R&D subsidy a¤ects incentives to innovate at di¤erent industries, we start by noticing from (16) that @x 0 @x 1 = 0:
In other words, when neck-and-neck …rms choose their R&D e¤ort x 0 optimally, they only take into account their own R&D investment, as the rivals e¤ort equals x 0 in a symmetric Markov equilibrium. Important strategic interaction, however, arises from the fact that the innovative activity of the follower is a¤ected by the responses of the neck-and-neck …rm. In fact, it can be shown that in the symmetric equilibrium
Given that derivative @x 1 =@x 0 is negative, there is a strategic substitutability between the innovative activity of the follower and that of the neck-and-neck …rm: any factor that increases the innovative activity of the neck-and-neck …rm, will decrease the innovative activity of the follower. Moreover, looking at @x 1 =@x 0 from a partial equilibrium perspective, we can see that strategic substitutability is 'strongest'when the innovative activity of the neck-and-neck …rm x 0 is very small. In fact, it can easily be seen that
On the contrary, as x 0 starts deviating from zero, we …nd that strategic substitutability e¤ect starts declining. Furhermore, from (16) it is clear that
for all realistic values of pro…t di¤erence ( 1 0 ) : In other words, an increase in the R&D subsidy will always increase the R&D e¤ort of a neck-and-neck …rm x 0 : In the case of the follower, however, the e¤ect is more complicated, precisely because of the strategic substitutability. By direct application of the chain rule, we however know that
Given that the partial derivatives on the right hand side are of opposite sign, the e¤ect of direct R&D subsidy on the followers incentives to innovate remains ambiguous. The strategic substitutability factor @x 1 @x0 plays here obviously an important role. When there is no competition, we know that x 0 ! 0 and thus the follower's response to R&D subsidies depend solely on the direct e¤ect @x 1 @ : Thus, it is clear that the direct R&D subsidy will have a positive e¤ect on the follower's innovating activity when the degree of competition is low. As competition gets more …erce and x 0 > 0 the sign of (27) becomes ambiguous. After some straightforward algebra, it can however be shown that
Condition (28) needs to be interpreted at the model's equilibrium. It is solely an implicit condition, given that the left hand side still depends upon pro…ts. As competition is getting more intense ( 0 ! 1 ) we know that 1 1 1 0 ! 1: Moreover, we know from above that the neck-and-neck …rm's R&D e¤ort will be larger than the follower's, ie x 0 > x 1 , when product market competition is …erce. Consequently, condition (28) still holds at high levels of competition. This means that the R&D subsidy increases the followers innovative activity also at high levels of competition. However according to 27, it is still clear that the strategic substitutability e¤ect @x 1 @x0 starts moderating the direct e¤ect of R&D subsidy when competition becomes harder.
Average innovation rate
Until know, we have derived the result that R&D subsidy a¤ects positively both the neckand-neck …rms'and the followers'incentives to innovate at low and high levels of competition. We have also shown that the strategic substitutability e¤ect moderates the direct e¤ect of R&D subsidy when competition becomes harder. However, the overall e¤ect of R&D subsidy needs still to be analyzed by taking into account that the degree of competition has a dynamic e¤ect determining the steady state distribution of leveled and unleveled industries in the economy (see section I).
We rely here on numerical simulations, which enable us to examine the e¤ects of direct R&D subsidy on incentives to innovate in the world located between monopoly and perfect competition. Figure 1 depicts the average innovation rate at di¤erent degrees of competition as well as at three di¤erent levels of R&D subsidy (0, 2%, 4%). The vertical axis measures the average innovation rate and the two other axis measure the R&D subsidy and degree of competition respectively. The degree of competition is measured by letting 0 increase from 0 to 1 . 7 This gives an inverted-U shape relationship between average rate of innovation and competition, just as in the original AHHV article. We observe that R&D subsidy accelerates innovation at all levels of competition. However, as product market competition gets more intense, the positive e¤ect of an R&D subsidy becomes weaker. This is due to the fact that strategic substitutability e¤ect discussed above becomes stronger. Alternatively, we can argue that when the Schumpeterian e¤ect starts dominating, the R&D subsidy makes it relatively stronger. This is implied by the fact higher R&D subsidy makes the inverted-U shape curve steeper at the high degrees of competition (see Figure 1 ).
Figure 1: Interaction between competition, rate of innovations and R&D subsidy in the model
II THE DATA AND MEASUREMENT ISSUES
We construct our unbalanced panel using data on the …nancing decisions of Tekes as our base population. We match to this data set …rm level accounting data and plant-level data on output from the data sets at the Business Structures Unit (BSU) of Statistics Finland. We further match R&D expenditures from the R&D panel data of the BSU and patent data from a data …le constructed by combining data drawn from the National Board of Patents and Registration of Finland (NBPR) and the so-called NBER patent citations …le (cf Hall, Ja¤e and Trajtenberg (2001)). 8 Concentrating on …rms which have received grants for R&D we expect to screen out the …rms conducting unsuccessful R&D. This is because we assume that evaluators of grant applications of the technology agency assess the feasibility of the R&D projects. Another advantage of using the grant data as the base population is that we reduce the problem of excess zeros of the dependent variable, the US patents, since the …rms applying for R&D subsidies are expected to conduct more R&D than the average …rm. We treat the observations with more than 50 patents per year as outliers and exclude them as well as outliers with respect to the competition measure. 9 Finally, after excluding the industries without any US patents during the period of observation our entire sample comprises 3340 observations of 1487 manufacturing companies between the years 1990 and 2001. The …nal sample contains 1514 US patents and 368 positive …rms/year observations of the dependent variable (patent counts). 10
Innovation intensity
Before turning to the empirical analysis it is worth discussing brie ‡y the relevant measurement issues. Following Aghion et al. (2005) , we use patent counts as the main indicator of innovative activity. We use information on patents granted by the United States Patenting O¢ ce (USPTO) and originating in Finland. We assume that most major Finnish innovations are patented in the US and thus, many low value patents should be screened out by focusing on USPTO patents.We run robustifying estimations using patent counts of patents …led at the Finnish Patents O¢ ce as the dependent variable and …nd that the results remain qualitatively the same.
The degree of market power
As discussed above, product market reforms are mainly expected to a¤ect innovation outcomes through the level of rents, or economic pro…ts, in the market. To capture this we follow Nickell (1996) and Aghion et al. (2005) and use the industry level Lerner index, a well established measure for measuring …rms'price-cost margins. Boone (2000) shows that the use of Lerner index as a measure for competition is preferred to most other commonly used measures. It is more theoretically robust than particularly those based on concentration or market shares. We calculate the inverse of the size-weighted industry level average of the Lerner index using a two-digit SIC code precision level. The measure takes value 0 for industries where no competition exists and 1, or larger, indicates perfect competition. Our plant level Lerner index is calculated as the annual output minus labor, intermediate good, capital costs and depreciation divided by output. 11 The industry level Lerner index is computed using the entire population of plants within the industry. Following Aghion et al. (2005) , we also construct an alternative measure for competition by removing the e¤ect of market share on a …rm's pro…t margin. Market share is measured as the …rm's share of output of the total output produced by …rms in the same two-digit industry.
Public funding
In general, any public intervention that aims at removing market imperfections and creates additionality in research could be considered as a form of R&D subsidy. However, since our theoretical measure of an R&D subsidy is closest related to a direct R&D subsidy that decreases the innovation costs proportionally, we chose to consider only direct R&D subsidies. We thus use data on the …nancing decisions of subsidies granted to product development by the National Technology Agency of Finland (Tekes). More speci…cally, we measure direct R&D funding as Tekes direct subsidies for product development. Direct R&D subsidies to …rms form the cornerstone of Tekes' funding (roughly 40% of the total budget of EUR 407.2 million) along with the other type of direct subsidy, grants for research projects. However, grants for research projects are mainly directed to universities and research institutes and would thus not contribute much to our analysis even if considered. 12 We construct our empirical measure by relating the annually received direct R&D subsidies to the …rms annual inhouse R&D expenditures. 13
Real life experiments as instruments
The …nal measurement issue concerns a potential endogeneity problem of our competition measure. One reason for endogeneity is that the variation in the Lerner index might be mainly caused by the variations in …xed costs. This could lead to biased relationship between Lerner index and patenting. We follow Aghion et al. (2005) and make use of real life experiments such as the implementation of the EU Single Market Programme and investigations by the Finnish competition authority (Kilpailuvirasto) as well as privatizations of large publicly owned enterprises in 8 two-digit industries to deal with the endogeneity problem. We end up with 23 excluded industry level instruments. A full description of the policy changes used as instruments for the Lerner index is found in the appendix. Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for our entire sample of 3340 observations. To begin with, it is …rst easy to see that, as usually when dealing with count data, our patent count distribution is highly skewed, with the majority of the …rms taking out no patents in any given year. The mean of the industry level Lerner index is 0.076, implying that the …rms' average price-cost margin is roughly 8 per cent. The average …rm sales per year of roughly 92.2 million EUR against the median of 6.2 million EUR indicates that the data are severely skewed with respect to …rm size. Also the employment …gures give an indication of a highly skewed distribution of size of …rms in our sample, with roughly 376 workers in the average …rm while the median …rm has 53 workers. The average R&D investment for a …rm is roughly EUR 2.8 million (of which the average fraction conducted internally is 2.5 million), yet there is wide variation within the sample; the median yearly investment on R&D almost a tenth of the mean. The average R&D subsidy (ie direct subsidy by Tekes to industry R&D) is EUR 209 000 and quite naturally, following from the distribution of R&D expenditures, this …gure is also skewed with the median yearly subsidy being EUR 70 000. The median of the R&D subsidy over inhouse R&D expenditures is roughly 24 percent of a …rm's in-house R&D investments. The unusually high mean of this relation is perhaps explained by the fact that some …rms have been unable to commit themselves to spending allocated R&D shares reported in grant applications. 
Descriptive statistics
III EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION
Our analysis follows that of Aghion et al. (2005) in that we start from a semiparametric log-linear speci…cation. In line with the theory, we assume that the innovation process, ie our discrete random variable x, is Poisson distributed with hazard rate x = exp (g (c)). The expected count of patents p satis…es a relation E[p j c] = exp (g (c)) where c is a measure of competition and g is some unknown function to be speci…ed later on. When industry …xed e¤ects, j , and time e¤ects, t are included to control for di¤erent permanent levels of patenting activity and common macroeconomic shocks, the average patent behavior is related to industry level competition according to
where i indexes …rms, j indexes industries and t indexes years. We control for the …rm speci…c time-invariant heterogeneity using pre-sample patent information following Blundell et al. (1995) . More speci…cally, we add a vector x i including the …rm's pre-sample patent stock and an indicator for non-zero pre-sample patent values to proxy for a …rm's technological knowledge stock. In this case, the Fixed E¤ects Poisson Estimator provides a consistent estimator for the expected number of patents. However, we acknowledge the fact that our patent counts data are excessively dispersed, as is usually the case with patent data sets. This leads to an incorrectly estimated variance-covariance matrix. We calculate the so called GLM standard errors to obtain the corrected variance-covariance matrix. 14 Following Aghion et al. (2005) , we …rst estimate the model where g (c) is approximated with a quadratic speci…cation. 15 The potential endogenity of our competition measure, the inverse of the Lerner index, is modeled following Wooldridge (1997), as dependence in the error terms of the form ln( ijt ) = v ijt + u ijt , where v is the residual in the …rst stage equation of our competition measure, the inverse of the Lerner index c jt against the policy instrument z jt , discussed above. Here u ijt is assumed to be independent of v ijt and of z jt . Equation (29) can then be written as a conditional expectation
Wooldridge (1999) shows that this can be estimated consistently by the standard …xed-e¤ect Poisson regression of Hausman et al. (1984) . Wooldridge (1999) also provides a method for calculating robust standard errors. 16 Note that v ijt is not observed, so we must replace it by its predicted valuesv ijt from the …rst stage equation. 17 We bootstrap the standard errors in order to remove the bias caused by the use of the prediction of v ijt as a variable in speci…cation (30). Only if = 0 will c jt be exogenous.
In order to study the interaction between product market competition and R&D subsidies, we allow the inverted-U relationship to change as the R&D subsidies are introduced. We add the interaction between competition, c jt , and the relative R&D subsidies (direct R&D subsidies per inhouse R&D expenditures), , to the basic quadratic speci…cation. We thus acquire a speci…cation of the form where E p ijt j c jt 1 ; ijt 1 ; x ijt 1 (31)
Here x ijt 1 is a vector of …rm covariates that control for other factors that might a¤ect the innovation performance of …rms. These covariates are the size of the …rm and the size interacted with a dummy variable which separates …rms at the median amount of subsidies.The theoretical results deliver clear testable predictions. The inverted-U shape between competition and innovation imply that the sign of the coe¢ cient 1 in the quadratic speci…cation (31) should be signi…cantly positive and that 2 should be signi…cantly negative, and that 2 2 > 1 , in order to turn the curve into an inverted-U shape within the range of the Lerner index. Our theoretical results further predict that 3 should be positive, thus shifting the level of the inverted-U shape upwards when R&D subsidies are increased. The coe¢ cient of the quadratic interaction term 5 should be negative in order to steepen the inverted-U relationship when competition becomes more intense. The strength of the latter e¤ect also depends on the coe¢ cient of the linear interaction term 4 ; which, relative to 5 ; should not be too large in absolute terms.
IV RESULTS
The inverted-U relationship
The estimation results from the quadratic speci…cation of Aghion et al. (2005) model are presented in Table 2 . In general, these …ndings provide mixed evidence of an inverted-U relationship between competition and innovation. In column I, where we estimate the standard …xed e¤ects Poisson regression without controlling for possible endogeneity of competition, the estimated coe¢ cient for the inverse of Lerner index c jt 1 is insigni…cant. The same applies for the squared term c 2 jt 1 . Furthermore, the estimated coe¢ cient of c 2 jt 1 is not large enough to turn the function into an inverted U-shape. After controlling for endogeneity, the results are somewhat more promising (column II). In column II, we present the results from the estimation similar to speci…cation in column I, but treating the inverse of the Lerner index as endogenous. We check the robustness of the lerner measure by removing the e¤ect of market share from the measure and …nd that the results remain qualitatively the same. The estimation is based on a control function approach. In other words, we estimate two reduced form equations, one for c jt 1 and one for c 2 jt 1 , and use the prediction of the residuals from these regressions as a control function in the second stage regression. The statistics of the reduced form regressions are provided in the lower part of Table 2 . The estimated coe¢ cients suggests now that there is an inverted-U shape relationship between innovations and competition. However, the coe¢ cients for c jt 1 and c 2 jt 1 turn out to be imprecisely estimated, although we control for …rm size and …rm speci…c heterogeneity. Notes: The sample consists of 3340 observations of manufacturing …rms in industries with patenting activity between years 1990 and 2001. In Column I we report the Fixed-e¤ects Poisson regression, while in column II we report the results where we control for potential endogeneity of c jt 1 using a control function approach. The standard errors reported in brackets are Wooldridge (1999) distribution-and heteroscedasticity robust. In column II the standard errors are bootstrapped with 100 replications. 1) The partial R 2 for the excluded instrument in the reduced form regression.
2) The joint signi…cance test of excluded instruments. The superscript *** implies that the P-value of the F test is < 0.01. 3) F test of joint signi…cance of competition and competition. The superscript *** (**) in the table implies that the P-value of the F test is < 0.01 (0.05).
Interaction between competition, innovation and R&D subsidies
In this section we discuss the estimation results where we control for the possible interaction between competition and R&D subsidies. As discussed above, this is done by including interaction terms in the conditional mean function of innovations (see equation 31). The results are summarised in Table 3 . Notes: The sample consists of 1739 observations of manufacturing …rms in industries with patenting activity between years 1990 and 2001. In column I we reports the Fixed-e¤ects Poisson regression, while in column II we report the results where we control for potential endogeneity of c jt 1 using a control function approach. The standard errors reported in brackets are Wooldridge (1999) distribution-and heteroscedasticity robust. In column II the standard errors are bootstrapped with 100 replications. 1) The partial R 2 for the excluded instrument in the reduced form regression. 2) The joint signi…cance test of excluded instruments.
3) F test for the joint signi…cance of competition. The superscript *** (**) in the table implies that the P-value of the F test is < 0.01 (0.05).
In column I we show the results of the Fixed-E¤ects Poisson estimation. An inverted-U shape is obtained with the coe¢ cients for c jt 1 and c 2 jt 1 both being highly signi…cant. The coe¢ cient of R&D subsidies is positive and signi…cant at the 5 per cent level, suggesting that an R&D subsidy per se has a positive e¤ect on patenting activity. The coe¢ cient of linear interaction term c jt 1 ijt 1 is negative, but signi…cant only at 10 percent level. There is thus weak evidence that R&D subsidies steepen the inverted-U shape between competition and innovation at high degrees of competition. The coe¢ cient of the quadratic interaction term c 2 jt 1 ijt 1 is also negative as predicted by the theory. However, this coe¢ cient is rather imprecisely estimated.
In column II we add a control function similar to the one in the basic quadratic estimation (see column II of Table 2 ). Since the interaction terms could also be endogenous, we run four …rst stage regressions using the policy instrument discussed in section (II). The statistics of the …rst stage regressions are provided in the lower part of Table 3 con…rming the validity of the instruments. In the second stage regression, we obtain an inverted-U shape between competition and innovation although the signi…cance of the coe¢ cients of c jt 1 and c 2 jt 1 exceed the 10 per cent level. The interaction terms are no longer signi…cant, but the coe¢ cients have the same signs as in the basic …xed-e¤ect Poisson case of column I.
Two features stand out clearly from columns I and II in Table 3 . First, …rms receiving more R&D subsidies show a higher level of innovation activity for any level of competition except for nearly perfect competition. Second, the results provide at least weak evidence that the inverted-U shape becomes steeper when R&D subsidies are increased. Perhaps the most illustrative way to compare our empirical …ndings with the theoretical results is to simulate the estimated relationship between innovation and competition. The results of this exercise are shown in Figure 2 , where we simulate the estimated model, …rst at the median level of R&D subsidies, and then inducing 10 and 20 per cent increase to the level of subsidies. We let the inverse of the Lerner index to vary roughly from 0.7 to 1. The simulated model is based on the estimation results shown in column II of Table 3 . From Figure 2 we can see, that the Schumpeterian e¤ect is indeed stronger at high levels of product market competition, ie when (1-Lerner) index approaches one on the horizontal axis. There is some weak evidence that a negative cross-e¤ect of innovations and competition leads eventually into counteracting e¤ect of the R&D subsidy on innovative e¤ort. Finally, contrary to the theoretical results, the simulation suggests that increasing the level of R&D subsidies does not stimulate the innovative activity at low degrees of competition equally much as at moderate degrees.
V CONCLUSIONS
The modern Schumpeterian growth theory predicts that more intense competition increases the …rms innovative activities, at least up to a certain level. A proportional R&D subsidy, which decreases the costs of innovating, also accelerates innovations, but this e¤ect is smaller when competition is …erce. In other words, the proportional R&D subsidy reinforces the Schumpeterian e¤ect of innovation. Our empirical results are in general compatible with these views. Using the …rm and plant level data on patenting activity, product market competition and R&D subsidies for Finnish …rms, we …nd support for an inverted-U shape relationship between patenting activity of the …rms and the degree of competition. We also …nd some evidence that R&D subsidies increase innovative e¤ort at medium level of competition. This e¤ect becomes smaller when competition becomes more intense. In fact, a negative cross-e¤ect of innovations and competition leads eventually into counteracting e¤ect of the R&D subsidy on innovative e¤ort at very high levels of competition.
APPENDIX
Policy instrument
We follow Aghion et al. (2005) and use three types of exogenous policy instruments: the implementation of the EU Single Market Programme (SMP), investigations by the Finnish Competition Authority (Kilpailuvirasto), and major privatizations. The aims of the SMP were to remove internal barriers in the EU in order to achieve the free movement of goods, services, capital and labor. The European Commission's White Paper (1985) outlined around three hundred speci…c measures which were designed to implement the SMP. The measures that were aimed at promoting competition include instituting common rules on regulation, takeovers, state assistance to industry, patents and copyrights, company accounting and disclosure of information, opening up of public procurement to competitive tender and reducing intervention in agriculture. The, so called, Cecchini report attempts to measure the size of non-tari¤ barriers existing before the SMP. They use a series of surveys and technical papers to assign numerical values to the size of non-tari¤ barriers in each industry before the SMP. Mayes and Hart (1994) classify the industries that were ex ante expected to be strongly or moderately a¤ected by the implementation into 41 3-digit industries. The initial SMP programme was announced in 1986 and the implementation was scheduled to take place between 1988 and 1992. For countries such as Finland, that joined EU in 1995, division into pre-and postimplementation periods is all but self evident. We use here 1993 as the …rst post-implementation year, arguing that Finland as a candidate country participated in the ETA negotiations between 1990-1992. The Finnish competition authority undertakes the case-by-case investigations of potential distortions of competition, increasing prices or reducing consumer's choice. In cases where the competition authority …nds that this is the case, some remedial action is recommended. We use information on all cases in manufacturing industries betweeen 1988-2002. The complete list of cases including case numbers is supplied by the authors on request. We additionally use information on major Finnish privatizations of publicly owned companies in 8 two-digit manufacturing industries. We assume that the privatization a¤ects all …rms in the respective industry. A list of the privatizations are available from the authors upon request.
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See
3. The theoretical framework and the mathematical formalization presented in this section is that of Aghion et al. (1997 Aghion et al. ( , 2001 except where explicitly mentioned or ascribed to others.
4. The logarithmic …nal good technology, together with the nonlinear production cost structure c (x) = x k imply that the equilibrium pro…t ‡ows of the leader and the follower in an industry depend on only the technological gap m between them, not on their absolute technology levels.
For simplicity it is assumed that
1 and 1 are una¤ected by a change in competitiveness. According to Aghion and Howitt (1998) the analysis remains essentially unmodi…ed also for cases where 1 is increased and 1 reduced by an increase in competition.
6. An early contribution that arrives to the result that some intermediate degree of rivalry is most conducive to technological advance is Kamien and Schwartz (1974) .
7. The values of the pro…ts should be interpreted as price-cost margin between zero and ten per cent that is, high on the scale equals 10 per cent price-cost-margin. The values of subsidy should be intrepreted as percentage of the total R&D expenditures.
8. We match patents by their application date.
9. There were 11 observations with more than 50 patents per year in the original patent data.
10. We also make use of complete data on patents applied at the Finnish Patents O¢ ce (Patentti-ja Rekisterihallitus). In our …nal sample there are 693 …rm/years with positive observations including altogether 3820 patents.
11. We use 15 per cent as the depreciation rate, the capital stock is calculated using PIM assuming a 15 per cent depreciation rate and de ‡ated to year 2000 prices. We then in ‡ate the measure back to current prices using the implicit price index from the data. We assume that the capital cost is 5 per cent for all …rms across time.
12. Since the founding of Tekes in 1982, its role in the national innovation system has increased steadily and direct subsidies have become the main form of …nancing. An increasing part of the funding is directed at SMEs which got roughly 60% of industry funding in 2001. Tekes can provide SMEs with R&D grants of up to 35% of total project …nance and R&D loans of up 70% of the predicted costs of a project. These …gures are lower for large companies, and …nance is granted only on condition of some degree of networking or other cooperation.
13. We consider the the …rm/year observations where zero inhouse R&D expenditures were reported despite received R&D subsidies as irregularities and exclude them from the analysis.
14. See Wooldridge (2002, Ch. 19) and Allison and Waterman (2002) .
15. In an earlier version of the paper (cf. Kilponen and Santavirta (2004) ), we experimented with non-parametric methods, such as Kernel estimation and spline estimation, in order to adopt more ‡exible functional form. We found evidence of a two peaked relationship between citation weighted patents and degree of competition, both using a cubic spline and a Gaussian Kernel regression.
16. In practice the standard errors can be corrected by rescaling the variance-covariance matrix by the square root of relation of the Pearson residual to degrees of freedom.
17. Under the maintained assumption that our 1st stage regression is correctly speci…ed, the estimated values ofv ijt can be used in place of v ijt . This is because plim T !1vijt = v ijt . Although the use of these regressors does not a¤ect consistency, the standard errors need to be corrected. We apply the bootstrapping method.
18. When using data on domestic patents we obtain similar results. The following coe¢cients (standard errors) for c jt 1 , c 2 jt 1 , c jt 1 ijt 1 and c 2 jt 1 ijt 1 were obtained: 48.519 (27.395 ), -24.818 (15.181 ), -2.901 (7.435 ) and 0.133 (0.109 ) respectively.
